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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On May 17, 2004, 38-
year-old Cobourg Police 
Service Constable Chris 
Garrett was stabbed to 
death while investigating 
suspicious activity in an 
abandoned hospital. Two 
other officers had just left the scene when they 
heard gunshots from the area. When they 
returned to the location they found Constable 
Garrett suffering from a stab wound to his neck. 
He was taken to a local 
hospital where he died from 
his wounds. An 18-year-old 
suspect was arrested later in 
the day. He is survived by his 
wife and two children. 
 
On May 23, 2004, 32-year-old Ontario Provincial 
Police Constable Tyler Boutilier died from 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident while 
responding to a call near Seeleys Bay. He was 
driving southbound on Highway 15 when his 
patrol car was struck by a vehicle driving the 
opposite way. He was transported to a local 
hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. 
Constable Boutilier had 
served with the Ontario 
Provincial Police for 4 years 
and was a member of the 
Emergency Response Team. 
He is survived by his wife. 
 
This information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page 
available at www.odmp.org/Canada. 
 
 
 
 
HIGH SPEED PURSUIT IS A 
YCJA ‘VIOLENT OFFENCE’ 
R. v. C.D.K., 2004 ABCA 77 
 
A young person pleaded guilty 
to dangerous driving and 
possession of stolen property 
after he stole a vehicle and 
became involved in a 30 minute high speed 
pursuit. He ran two red lights, a stop sign, drove 
at speeds up to 120km/h in posted 60km/h 
zones, swerved to avoid traffic, and often drove 
on the wrong side of the road. Despite driving 
over a spike belt deflating all four tires, the 
accused did not stop until he collided with a 
fence.  
 
At sentencing, the judge classified dangerous 
driving as a “violent offence” under the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), thereby permitting 
custodial sentencing under s.39(1)(a). In her 
view, “the violence of a car, speeding through the 
city chased by the police is, by anyone’s 
definition, violent.” The judge imposed a six 
month term of deferred custody, followed by 
one month probation. The accused appealed to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal arguing that the 
custodial sentence was inappropriate.  
 
Sentencing a youth to a custodial sentence 
involves a two-stage process. First, the offence 
must be a “violent offence”, or other 
classification under s.39(1) of the YCJA. Second, 
all sentencing alternatives short of custody must 
be considered before custody is imposed. In 
holding that the offence in this case fell within 
the parameters of a “violent offence” under the 
YCJA, Justice Ritter for the Alberta Court of 
Appeal stated: 
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[I]f it is reasonably foreseeable that 
criminal conduct  may result in bodily harm 
that is more than merely trifling or 
transitory, the offence is violent for the 
purposes of s. 39(1)(a) of the [YCJA]. In 
this instance the potential for harm is 
obvious. High speed chases are very 
dangerous and can easily result in serious 
injury or death. I therefore conclude that 
the sentencing judge did not err when she 
determined that the offence was violent and 
that a custodial sentence was available. 
[para. 7] 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
DETENTION DEPENDS ON 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
R. v. Nicholas, 
(2004) Docket:C36906, C36188, C36025 
(Ont.C.A.) 
 
The accused was approached as a 
person of interest in the 
investigation of a series of break 
and enters and sexual assaults 
committed by a person nicknamed the 
“Scarborough Bedroom Rapist”. Acting on a 
Crime Stoppers tip, police attended his home and 
were directed upstairs to his room. He came out 
of the bathroom, wearing only a towel, and was 
told by the detectives about the investigation, 
that he was a person of interest, and that they 
wanted to speak with him. He agreed, but wanted 
to get dressed first.  
 
After moving to a different room in the house at 
the request of police, a detective read a consent 
form and the accused agreed to provide a buccal 
swab to be used for DNA analysis relative to 
break and enter investigations occurring 
between June 23 to August 21, 1999. The 
detective again read the consent form—this time 
with a tape recorder on. The accused said he 
understood, was told he could speak with a 
lawyer or anyone else, and was asked if he had 
any questions. He signed the form, swabbed his 
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mouth, and turned the samples over. The police 
left, the samples were analyzed, and a match 
between the accused’s DNA and the DNA left at 
two crime scenes was established.  
 
A search warrant was subsequently obtained for 
his house and a handgun was found in his 
bedroom closet. The accused was arrested and 
charged with 13 criminal counts related to three 
incidents. Later, the police realized that the 
time frame outlined in the consent excluded one 
of the break and enter incidents occurring on 
September 13, 1999. To rectify this, they 
obtained and executed a DNA warrant under 
s.486.05 of the Criminal Code. Again his DNA 
matched the crime scene profiles. 
 
At his trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, the accused argued that he was 
detained at his home and improperly informed 
about his right to counsel contrary to s.10(b) of 
the Charter. Further, he submitted that he did 
not provide an informed and voluntary consent to 
the taking of his DNA sample. Thus, he 
contended the seizure was unreasonable under 
s.8 of the Charter.  
 
The trial judge rejected both of these 
arguments. First, he found the accused had not 
been detained—the police never assumed 
physical control over him and any directions 
given were about where the conversation would 
take place. With respect to consent, the judge 
concluded it was both voluntary and informed. 
However, the court found the accused’s s.8 
Charter right was breached by the use of the 
DNA sample for the September 13, 1999 
offence—because it was outside the time frame 
specified in the consent—but the evidence was 
admitted under s.24(2) of the Charter anyway.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing he was detained, 
that his right to counsel under s.10(b) of the 
Charter was violated, and that his consent in 
providing the DNA sample was not valid.  
 
 
The Detention 
 
Even though a person is not physically 
restrained, they still may be subject to a 
detention within the meaning of the Charter if 
they are “psychologically detained”. A detention 
of this nature arises when the police give a 
person a demand or direction and the person 
submits or acquiesces to the deprivation of their 
liberty because they reasonably believe they 
have no choice but to do so. However, in 
determining whether a person feels compelled to 
comply with the police their testimony is often a 
relevant—but not always necessary—factor. In 
this case the accused did not testify about 
whether he reasonably felt his freedom had 
been restrained, leaving it open to the trial 
judge to decide whether a detention occurred. 
In finding no basis for disturbing the trial 
judge’s conclusion, Justice Abella, authoring the 
unanimous judgment, stated: 
  
There is no evidence of any kind in this case 
indicating that [the accused] felt 
psychologically compelled to speak to the 
police or to provide a sample. [The 
detective] testified that the police had not 
made any demand of [the accused], nor had 
they ordered him to do anything, and [the 
accused] did not express any concern or 
confusion either before sitting down at the 
kitchen table or after having the consent 
form read to him. 
 
While it was undoubtedly disconcerting to 
[the accused], dressed in a towel, to find 
the police waiting for him outside his 
bathroom door, this alone is an insufficient 
fact to ground a finding of detention given 
what happened next. He was permitted to 
change, and while it is true that the police 
waited for him outside his bedroom while he 
got dressed, the only direction they gave 
him was that they speak in the kitchen 
because the light in his bedroom was not 
working. 
 
The trial judge found that the suggestion by 
the police that they move to the kitchen was 
not a demand or direction, and that the 
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police were polite and non-threatening to 
[the accused]. The consent form, which was 
read twice to [the accused], clearly stated 
that he could refuse to provide the sample. 
[The accused] was not arrested at the end 
of the interview and the police continued 
their investigation. The police were 
conducting the consent DNA sampling 
procedure with other residents and had over 
one hundred persons of interest. [para. 42-
44] 
 
The Consent 
 
When the issue of consent arises in the context 
of a s.8 Charter argument the onus is on the 
Crown to establish, on a balance of probabilities, 
that the accused waived his constitutional 
protection to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. The test for consent has been 
previously laid down by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in R. v. Wills (1992) 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529 
(Ont.C.A.) and involves the following six factors: 
 
• Consent was given, express or implied; 
 
• The person consenting had the authority to 
give consent; 
 
• The consent was voluntary—free from police 
oppression, coercion, or other conduct 
negating the freedom to choose; 
 
• The person was aware of what the police 
wanted to do; 
 
• The person was aware of the right to refuse 
the police request—which may require, in 
some cases, expressly telling someone they 
have the right to refuse; and 
 
• The person was aware of the potential 
consequences of giving the consent. 
 
In addressing these aspects, Justice Abella 
held: 
 
The application of the factors in Wills to 
this case demonstrates that the Crown has 
established that [the accused] consented to 
the seizure of his DNA, at least in relation 
to the [two incidents occurring between 
June 23 to August 21, 1999]. The police 
informed [the accused] twice that they 
wanted to speak to him about a series of 
break-ins and sexual assaults. [The accused] 
was informed that the police were 
investigating a series of assaults, that he 
was a person of interest, that the sample 
would be scientifically analysed, and that it 
would be compared with evidence obtained 
from the crime scenes. The police explicitly 
told [the accused] that this comparison was 
to enable the police to identify the person 
responsible for the crimes and that the 
DNA sample could be used in criminal 
proceedings against him. The consent form 
stated that the police were seeking 
permission, and that [the accused] did not 
have to provide the sample. [para. 50] 
 
The trial judge’s ruling respecting the 
September 13, 1999 incident was also well 
reasoned and it was unnecessary to interfere 
with it. The accused’s conviction appeal was 
dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
15 MINUTE ASD DELAY NOT 
REQUIRED IN ALL CASES 
R. v. Einarson,  
(2004) Docket: C40288 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was stopped by 
police after she was seen 
driving out from a bar parking 
lot, go towards a R.I.D.E. spot 
check, and then make a u-turn before reaching 
the checkpoint. An odour of alcohol was 
detected on her breath, her eyes were red and 
glassy, and her speech slightly slurred. In 
response to questioning, she twice denied 
drinking. A demand for a breath sample into an 
approved screening device was made under 
s.254(2) of the Criminal Code and the accused 
failed. She was arrested for over 80mg%, read 
the breath demand, and subsequently provided 
two breath samples over the legal limit.  
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At trial the officer testified he was aware that 
if a person had consumed alcohol within 15 
minutes of the roadside sample being taken, 
residual mouth alcohol could render a “false” fail 
and the test would be inaccurate (unreliable). In 
the officer’s view, the reason he asked the 
questions about alcohol consumption—even 
though the accused could have lied—was because 
he believed he was obligated to eliminate the 
possibility the accused had consumed alcohol 
within the preceding 15 minutes before 
immediately administering the test. The trial 
judge rejected the accused’s arguments that the 
officer could not rely on the fail reading because 
he should have waited 15 minutes to exclude the 
possibility alcohol was recently consumed. The 
accused was convicted.  
 
On appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, the accused’s conviction was set aside 
and a new trial was ordered. Superior Court 
Justice Spiegel ruled that because the officer 
did not know the accused had not consumed 
alcohol within the 15 minutes prior to the sample 
being taken, he should have waited 15 minutes to 
avoid the possibility of a false fail. Thus, the 
officer could not rely upon the potentially 
unreliable test result as forming part of his 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest 
and breathalyzer demand. However, a new trial 
was ordered to determine if there was still 
enough reasonable and probable grounds absent 
the ASD fail reading.  
 
The Crown appealed the Superior Court order to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal. The question on 
appeal became whether the officer was entitled 
to rely on ASD results in forming reasonable and 
probable grounds when he knew there was a 
possibility that the accused had consumed 
alcohol within the 15 minutes prior to the 
administration of the test which, if she had, 
would result in an inaccurate test.  
 
Justice Doherty, authoring the unanimous 
judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, first 
summarized the impaired driving investigative 
regime under the Criminal Code. He wrote: 
 
Section 254(2) is stage one of the two-stage 
investigatory process set out in s. 254 
intended to facilitate the detection, arrest 
and conviction of those committing drinking 
and driving offences. Section 254(2) allows a 
police officer, on mere suspicion that a driver 
has alcohol in his body, to demand that the 
driver provide a sample of breath into an 
approved screening device. If the driver 
refuses to provide that sample, he or she may 
be charged with an offence under s. 254(5) of 
the Criminal Code. If the driver provides the 
sample and registers a "fail" on the screening 
device, there are no immediate criminal 
consequences. It is not a crime to fail the 
screening device, nor can the results be used 
to prove that a driver was impaired or that his 
or her blood/alcohol level was over the legal 
limit. However, if the driver registers a "fail" 
on the screening device, that result either 
alone or in combination with other observations 
made by the officer may provide the officer 
with reasonable and probable grounds to 
conclude that the driver had committed a 
drinking and driving offence. If the officer 
comes to that conclusion, he or she may arrest 
the driver and make a breathalyzer demand 
under s. 254(3). Refusal to comply with that 
demand absent reasonable excuse is a criminal 
offence under s. 254(5). If the driver complies 
with the breathalyzer demand, the results may 
be admissible against the driver on a charge of 
impaired driving or driving while having a 
blood/alcohol level over the legal limit. 
 
Section 254(2) provides a ready, quick and 
reliable means by which an officer can 
determine whether there are reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest a driver for a 
drinking and driving offence and make a 
breathalyzer demand. The ready availability of 
the roadside screening device also has a 
valuable deterrent effect. Clearly, the 
roadside screening device serves these 
salutary purposes only if it yields accurate 
information. 
 
Although a driver who is subject to a demand 
under s. 254(2) is detained by the police, that 
 6            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 4 Issue 3 
  May/June 2004 
section has been held to be a justifiable limit 
on the driver's right to retain and instruct 
counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter…Section 
254(2) is justified under s. 1 of the Charter as 
a necessary response to the pervasive problem 
of drinking and driving. In holding that s. 
254(2) is a justified limitation on individual 
constitutional rights, the courts have stressed 
the requirement in the section that the sample 
be taken "forthwith" thereby significantly 
limiting the duration of the individual's 
detention. An unwarranted delay, even if 
relatively brief, will take the demand outside 
of the ambit of s. 254(2) and render the 
detention unconstitutional… 
 
A police officer who has cause to make a 
demand under s. 254(2) must administer the 
test "forthwith" if the detention is to remain 
within constitutionally permissible limits. At 
the same time, it is well-known by police 
officers that where a driver has consumed 
alcohol in the 15 to 20 minutes before the test 
is administered, the result of the test may be 
unreliable because of the presence of residual 
mouth alcohol. The whole purpose of 
administering the test under s. 254(2) is to 
assist the officer in determining whether 
there are reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest the driver for a drinking and driving 
offence. If the officer does not, or reasonably 
should not, rely on the accuracy of the test 
results, it cannot assist in determining 
whether there are reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest. Administering the test 
without delay in those circumstances would be 
pointless and would defeat the purpose for 
which the test is administered. [paras. 11-14, 
references omitted] 
 
Justice Doherty concluded that any assessment 
of the timing of the breath samples requires a 
flexible approach on a case-by-case basis. 
Rather than demanding the officer wait 15 
minutes before administering a test when there 
is a mere possibility a driver had consumed 
alcohol recently, the court must focus on the 
reasonableness of the officer’s belief as to the 
accuracy of the test when it was administered. 
In this case, the unreliability of the test was 
speculative at best, considering what information 
the officer had. In summary, the court held: 
 
If an officer honestly believes that some delay 
is necessary to obtain an accurate sample and 
if that belief is reasonable in the 
circumstances, a test administered after an 
appropriately brief delay remains within the 
scope of s. 254(2). The fact that an officer 
had observed the driver leaving a bar moments 
earlier is a circumstance that has relevance to 
the question of whether it was reasonable for 
the officer to delay the taking of the test in 
order to obtain an accurate sample. 
 
The flexible approach to s. 254(2) accepts 
that different officers may assess similar 
circumstances differently in deciding whether 
some brief delay in the administration of the 
s. 254(2) test is necessary. Indeed, the 
reasonable and probable standard must reflect 
the particular officer's assessment tested 
against the litmus of reasonableness. In 
considering whether to rely on test results 
absent some brief delay, one officer may give 
more significance to the fact that the driver 
was seen leaving a bar just before he or she 
was stopped (particularly where the driver 
admits drinking in that bar) than another 
officer might give to that fact. The first 
officer might delay the taking of the test for 
an appropriately short time while a second 
officer may proceed without delay. Neither 
officer has necessarily acted improperly. If 
the officer decides to delay taking the test 
and that delay is challenged at trial, the court 
must decide whether the officer honestly and 
reasonably believed that an appropriately 
short delay was necessary to obtain a reliable 
reading. If the officer decides not to delay 
the administration of the test and that 
decision is challenged at trial, the court must 
decide whether the officer honestly and 
reasonably believed that he could rely on the 
test result if the test was administered 
without any delay. 
 
[T]he mere possibility that a driver has 
consumed alcohol within 15 minutes before 
taking the test does not preclude an officer 
from relying on the accuracy of the statutorily 
approved screening device. Where an officer 
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honestly and reasonably concludes on the basis 
of available information that he can form no 
opinion as to whether the driver consumed 
alcohol within the prior 15 to 20 minutes, the 
officer is entitled to rely on the accuracy of 
the statutorily approved screening device and 
administer the test without delay. That is not 
to say that another officer might not assess 
the same situation differently and have 
legitimate concerns about the reliability of a 
test administered without a brief delay and 
act accordingly. In each case, the officer's 
task is to form an honest belief based on 
reasonable grounds about whether a short 
delay is necessary to obtain a reliable reading 
and to act on that belief. [paras. 33-35, 
references omitted] 
 
The appeal was allowed and the conviction and 
sentence imposed at trial were restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
CONTEMPORANEOUS 
RECORDING DESIRABLE, BUT 
NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED 
R. v. Ducharme, 2004 MBCA 29 
 
The accused was arrested as 
the “get-away driver” of a car 
used in a shotgun robbery of a 
Winnipeg hotel lounge. He was 
the last of five suspects 
apprehended in the robbery. He was arrested, 
handcuffed, cautioned, and transported to the 
police station by two police officers. One of the 
officers made notes of any conversations during 
this interval. The accused was paraded before 
the station duty sergeant and then placed in an 
interview room for an hour before being turned 
over to two Major Crimes Unit detectives. He 
was interviewed for 35 minutes by the 
detectives, which was recorded in five pages of 
writing. Following this question and answer 
interview, the accused said he was willing to give 
a more complete statement on videotape. He 
subsequently provided a 26 minute statement 
that was contemporaneously recorded on video. 
At trial, all three statements—the notes made 
during the arrest and transport, the written 
preliminary interview, and the videotaped 
statement—were relevant to the charges against 
the accused. However, the accused argued that 
the Crown had failed to satisfy the confessions 
rule in establishing the statements made to 
police were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
The accused testified the police extracted his 
statements by using physical force and 
intimidation—thus creating an atmosphere of 
oppression—by threatening to charge his 
common law wife, which would cause Child and 
Family Services to take his children. After 
weighing credibility, the trial judge ruled the 
statements admissible and a conviction was 
entered. However, the judge was troubled with 
the fact that the first interview was not 
recorded on audio or video tape, even though the 
equipment and facilities were readily available.  
 
The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting the statements because no 
contemporaneous recordings were made—other 
than the final interview—to assess the 
voluntariness of the statements. In short, the 
accused was suggesting that without an 
electronic recording it must automatically be 
concluded the confession was improperly 
obtained. 
 
Justice Kroft, delivering the judgment of the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal, dismissed the 
accused’s appeal. In summarizing the current 
state of recording interviews, he noted: 
 
It is only recently that we reached a stage in 
criminal investigation where it can be said that 
when an accused person is in police custody, 
there will usually be no reason why interviews 
and interrogations cannot be recorded 
electronically and, more specifically, 
videotaped. Such a requirement is economically 
and technically feasible. A statutory 
requirement that videotaping, perhaps subject 
to exceptions, becomes a prerequisite of 
admissibility and would be capable of 
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enforcement. Indeed, the Homicide 
Department of the Winnipeg Police Service 
already follows a self-imposed protocol for 
videotaping the statements that go on in its 
interview rooms. 
 
If such a policy were enshrined in law, it would 
protect accused persons from actual or 
threatened force or intimidation. At the same 
time, it would limit the possibility of police 
misconduct and protect them from false 
accusations of abuse or oppression. The 
trouble for all of us, including trial and 
appellate courts, is that there are no statutory 
provisions or Supreme Court dicta imposing the 
policy which we are now addressing. [paras. 22-
23] 
 
Although concurrent videotaping of a confession 
is usually desirable, the court rejected the 
contention that the contemporaneous 
videotaping of an interview was a legal 
requirement before it could be declared 
voluntary. In other words, “non-recorded 
interviews need not be automatically treated as 
suspect”.  However, there are definite 
advantages to videotaping statements. Verbal 
and physical interactions are recorded allowing a 
judge to know exactly what has transpired, 
greatly assisting them in assessing voluntariness. 
Any air of suspicion can be alleviated by 
providing a neutral, reliable, and accurate 
recording. After reviewing case law and other 
materials, Justice Kroft held: 
 
[T]he case before us has never been about the 
desirability of videotaping. The trial judge 
forcefully expressed his views and lest there 
be any doubt, it seems inconceivable to me 
that one could argue against the practice. The 
difficulty is that until either the Supreme 
Court articulates or Parliament legislates the 
duties of the police and lays out a protocol to 
be followed, the common law definition of 
voluntariness will remain in effect. That being 
the case, it cannot be said that the failure to 
videotape or electronically record will 
automatically mean the exclusion of the 
evidence on a voir dire. 
……… 
All of the foregoing leads me to the inevitable 
conclusion that the trial judge dealt with his 
dilemma in the only way he could. The 
concurrent video transcription of confessions 
is definitely to be preferred. It is, however, 
not an absolute legal requirement.    The 
admissibility of confessions and inculpatory 
statements must be determined by a trial 
judge on the conclusion of a voir dire. If his or 
her findings of fact are not patently 
unreasonable and, if no error in law can be 
found, then an appellate court ought not to 
intervene by reason only of its preference for 
a recorded statement and the conviction 
appeal should fail. [para. 46, 48] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org. 
 
WARRANTLESS ENTRY 
LAWFUL TO INVESTIGATE 
ALARM 
R. v. Johnston, 2004 BCCA 148 
 
At about 8pm a police officer 
responded to an alarm at a multi-
unit commercial building. He 
arrived about three minutes 
after the dispatch, although unknown to the 
officer 45 minutes had elapsed from the time 
police received the alarm. He walked around the 
building to determine if the doors were locked, 
knocked on a door, and was admitted by a tenant, 
Mr. Ghannadzadeh, who told the officer that he 
believed the alarm was triggered by people 
upstairs doing tests. Mr. Ghannadzadeh asked 
the officer to check other parts of the building. 
The officer checked other doors and found a 
suite (#1401-B) with an unlocked door. He 
identified himself as the police, entered, and 
tripped the alarm. He opened a door at the rear 
of the suite and found a 100 plant marihuana 
grow operation.  
 
Mr. Ghannadzadeh informed the officer of the 
accused’s tenancy in suite #1401-B. The officer 
left the suite and saw a vehicle drive to the rear 
of the building. He was told by Mr. 
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Ghannadzadeh that the vehicle belonged to the 
tenant of suite 1401-B. However, by the time the 
officer approached the vehicle, the driver was 
gone. The officer went back to the suite and 
knocked on the door to determine if there was 
any connection between the accused and the 
initial alarm call. The accused answered, 
identified himself on request, and admitted he 
was part owner of the business operating out of 
the suite which housed the grow operation. The 
accused was arrested, provided his s.10(b) 
Charter right to counsel, and asked if he wished 
to contact a lawyer. He replied, “No, I’d like to 
call my wife”, but was denied the opportunity. 
The officer then attended the police station and 
obtained a search warrant. The accused was 
subsequently charged with producing marihuana 
and marihuana possession for the purpose of 
trafficking.  
 
At trial, the officer testified he detained the 
accused to determine why he had gone into the 
building and turned off the alarm. As for not 
advising the accused of his Charter rights 
before engaging in conversation, the officer said 
he was trying to confirm information. With 
respect to denying a phone call to his wife, the 
officer said the accused did not tell him he 
wanted to call his wife in order to retain counsel. 
The officer testified the accused had the right 
to call a lawyer, not his wife.  
 
The trial judge ruled that the officer’s 
warrantless entry was lawful—to ensure the 
security of the building for the safety of 
persons who might be present. As well, the 
officer acted in good faith. He acted 
appropriately and went no further than was 
reasonable. Also, the officer attended as 
promptly as reasonable and did not have to 
inquire into the immediacy of the alarm or the 
resources available. The trial judge also said: 
 
The peace officer was granted entry into the 
building by another tenant of the building.  
That tenant suggested a possible area of 
interest to search, and the peace officer 
gained access to premises of the accused 
through an unlocked door, which activated the 
alarm for a second time. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
officer’s initial entry into the suite was unlawful 
and that his s.10(b) Charter right was breached.  
 
The Entry 
 
The accused suggested that since there was no 
criminal activity taking place when the officer 
arrived, his warrantless entry into the premises 
was a violation of s.8 of the Charter. In 
rejecting this view, Justice Oppal for the 
unanimous appeal court held: 
 
In this case, the officer was not acting 
unlawfully when he entered the premises 
without a warrant.  Although the initial alarm 
had sounded some 45 minutes prior to his 
arrival, he was apparently under the impression 
that the alarm had sounded 10 minutes prior to 
his arrival.  In any event, he was lawfully 
entitled to investigate what he reasonably 
believed to be a break and enter.  Mr. 
Ghannadzadeh had told him that there were 
other persons in the building and asked him to 
check other parts of the building.  The officer 
might have been subject to criticism had he 
left after his initial conversation with Mr. 
Ghannadzadeh during which the latter advised 
him that the alarm had sounded some 45 
minutes earlier.  It should be noted as well 
that at that stage the officer had no reason to 
believe that there was a marihuana grow 
operation on the premises. [para. 11] 
 
The Right to Counsel 
 
The appeal court also dismissed the accused’s 
submission that the judge erred in failing to find 
a s.10(b) Charter breach because he was not 
allowed to call his wife. The court concluded: 
 
There is no doubt that immediately after the 
[accused] was detained the officer apprised 
him of his right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay under s. 10(b).  The [accused] 
advised the officer that he did not wish to 
contact a lawyer, but rather, that he wished to 
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contact his wife.  There would be some validity 
to the [accused’s] argument on this issue had 
he told the officer that he wished to contact 
his wife so that she might be able to arrange 
counsel for him.  However, he did not do that.  
The law is that a person who is arrested or 
detained and has been advised of his right to 
counsel under s. 10(b) must assert that 
right. [The  Supreme Court of Canada has] 
held that s. 10(b) imposes two duties on the 
police in addition to the duty to inform an 
arrested or detained person of his or her 
rights.  The first duty is to give the person a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise the right 
to retain and instruct counsel without delay.  
The second duty is to refrain from attempting 
to elicit further evidence from the detainee 
until he or she has had a reasonable 
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel.  
However, there is a caveat attached to the 
police obligations: the detained person must be 
reasonably diligent in attempting to obtain 
counsel.  If the detained person is not 
reasonably diligent, then the correlative duties 
imposed upon the police to refrain from 
questioning him or her are suspended.   
 
In this case the [accused] did not tell the 
police that he wished to speak to a lawyer. 
[para. 25-26, references omitted] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
LAUNDERING DOES NOT 
INCLUDE RECEIVING GOODS 
R. v. Daoust & Bois, 2004 SCC 6 
 
In an effort to establish 
whether the two accused were 
laundering merchandise at a 
pawn shop, an undercover police 
officer approached them on four occasions to 
sell “criminally obtained goods”—two new video 
recorders, a used video recorder, two new 
telephones, and a new alarm clock borrowed from 
a merchant assisting in the investigation. 
Although the goods were not actually stolen, the 
officer hinted they were “hot” or otherwise 
illegally obtained. In total, the officer received 
$60 for the goods.  
 
At their trial in the Court of Quebec, they were 
convicted of laundering proceeds of crime under 
s.462.31 of the Criminal Code. In the judge’s 
view, the transfer of possession of the property 
constituted the actus reus of the offence. The 
mens rea, in the judge’s opinion, included the 
intent to conceal or convert the property along 
with the knowledge or belief the property was 
obtained illegally.  
 
The accused appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal, which overturned the convictions and 
substituted acquittals. The appeal court ruled 
the actus reus had not been satisfied. Justice 
Fish held that the possession of the property 
had not been transferred nor did the accused 
intend to “convert”—change, transform, or 
alter—the purchased merchandise. Rather, he 
concluded the accused were going to sell the 
property rather than cover up a supposed crime. 
The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In a unanimous judgment, the seven 
members of the Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal.  
 
The Actus Reus 
 
In the indictment, the accused were charged 
with transferring the possession of property 
with the intent to conceal or convert it under 
s.462.31(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. However, the 
French Criminal Code version of this offence is 
narrower that the English version. The French 
version limits the transfer of property to an 
exhaustive list of enumerated acts, while the 
English version adds the expression “or 
otherwise deals with” which would open up other 
acts of laundering beyond those listed.  
 
These inconsistencies in the actus reus between 
the French and English version required the 
court to apply the principles of bilingual 
statutory interpretation as follows: 
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• determine whether there is discordance 
between the two versions; 
 
• if the two versions are irreconcilable, 
determine whether one or both versions are 
ambiguous—reasonably capable of more than 
one meaning. If there is ambiguity in only one 
version, they must be reconciled to a common 
meaning—the version that is plain and not 
ambiguous; 
 
• if neither version is ambiguous, the common 
meaning is usually the narrower meaning of 
the two; and 
 
• determine whether the common meaning is 
consistent with Parliament’s intent. 
 
In applying these rules to this case, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the two versions were 
identical except for the English addition of “or 
otherwise deals with”. Therefore, the more 
restrictive French version prevailed. 
 
The next question the court examined was 
whether the “transfer of possession” of 
property in the laundering proceeds of crime 
context includes buying property with the 
intention of converting it. In other words, does 
s.462.31 apply to the receiver of property? The 
court answered no.  
 
In the court’s view, “[t]he activities criminalized 
by this provision all concern the same person, 
that is, the person who originally has the object 
in his or her possession and seeks to dispose of 
it.” Section 354(1) of the Criminal Code, on the 
other hand, “is aimed specifically at persons who 
receive or accept property despite knowing it to 
be of illicit origin.”  Thus, as Justice Basterache 
authoring the unanimous judgment noted, “buying 
or receiving property or similar acts involving the 
person who accepts or acquires the property do 
not constitute elements of the offence of 
laundering proceeds of crime.”  The Court ruled: 
 
In the present case, the evidence shows 
that the [accused] bought the merchandise 
believing it to be stolen.  However, in light 
of the foregoing, the act of purchasing this 
merchandise is not the equivalent of 
"transfers the possession of", which is the 
element of the offence specified in the 
indictment and which the Crown must prove.  
For this reason, it is my opinion that the 
[accused] did not transfer the possession of 
the property within the meaning of s. 
462.31. [para. 53] 
 
The Mens Rea 
 
The mens rea of laundering proceeds of crime 
includes the intent to conceal or convert 
property or proceeds and the knowledge or 
belief that the property or proceeds were 
derived from a designated offence. The Quebec 
Court of Appeal erred in holding that an intent 
to disguise must be proven to establish mens rea 
under s.462.31. Justice Bastarache wrote: 
 
The verb "to convert", in my view, cannot be 
given the meaning of "disguise" or "conceal" 
unless there is an express indication to that 
effect in the enactment. Absent this, the 
term "convert" must be given its ordinary, 
literal meaning. While Parliament might have, 
in enacting s. 462.31, intended to prohibit 
acts to disguise or conceal the illicit origins 
of property or its proceeds, this was only a 
secondary purpose that was part of a much 
broader one, that is, to ensure that crime 
does not pay…Section 462.31 has a broad 
deterrent effect, in that it is designed to 
prevent offenders from profiting from their 
crimes or from engaging in illegal activities, 
an objective that has nothing to do with 
disguising the origins of property or its 
proceeds. 
 
Moreover, to read an intent to disguise into 
"convert" would mean that the offence of 
laundering proceeds of crime would apply 
only to clandestine transactions, while 
leaving the same acts, if committed openly, 
unpunished… 
 
In short, I believe Parliament's choice of 
words is indicative of its intention to forbid 
"conversion" pure and simple, thereby 
ensuring that those who convert property 
they know or believe to have illicit origins, 
regardless of whether they try to conceal it 
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or not, do not profit from it.  I am 
therefore of the opinion that Parliament's 
intent and purpose in enacting s. 462.31 
favours an interpretation of the word 
"convert" that does not include an intent to 
disguise.  The interpretation given by the 
Quebec Court of Appeal to the term 
"convert" is too narrow and excludes from 
the scope of s. 462.31 activities that 
Parliament intended to prohibit.[paras. 63-
65, references omitted] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca. 
 
DID YOU KNOW 
 
…that as of January 1, 2004 
the RCMP was 22,239 strong.  
Personnel breakdown, including 
all ranks and civilians, was as 
follows1: 
 
Position Strength 
Commissioner 1 
Deputy Commissioner 5 
Assistant Commissioner 24 
Chief Superintendent 56 
Superintendents 135 
Inspectors 331 
Corps Sergeant Major 1 
Sergeant Major 7 
Staff Sergeant Major 1 
Staff Sergeants 704 
Sergeants 1,568 
Corporals 2,777 
Constables 10,039 
Other regular members 4 
Civilian Members 2,585 
Public Servants 4,001 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
The best way to succeed in life is to act on the 
advice you give to others—Unknown 
                                                 
1 Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/organi_e.htm [May 17, 2004] 
DESIGN, NOT POTENTIAL 
USE, DETERMINES LEGALITY 
R. v. Jordan, 2004 BCCA 139 
 
The accused was charged with 
possession of a prohibited 
weapon—pepper spray—under 
s.91(2) of the Criminal Code 
after police detained him while investigating an 
attempted break-in of a house in a nearby 
residential area. When requested by the police to 
empty his pant pockets, the accused produced a 
can of pepper spray labelled “First Defence 
Aerosol Pepper Protector MK-3” with the 
following warning, “The use of this substance or 
device for any purpose other than self-defence is 
a felony under law. The contents are dangerous. 
Use with care.” Also, the back of the can 
indicated the contents contained a 10% solution 
of Oleoresin Capsicum—the active ingredient.   
 
A prohibited weapon is defined under s.84(1) as 
including a weapon prescribed by Regulations to 
be prohibited. One such weapon is described in 
the Regulations as follows: 
 
Any device designed to be used for the purpose of 
injuring, immobilizing or otherwise incapacitating any 
person by the discharge therefrom of  
(a)    tear gas, Mace or other gas; or 
(b)    any liquid, spray, powder or other substance that 
is capable of injuring, immobilizing or otherwise 
incapacitating any person. 
 
At the accused’s trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court an expert testified he examined 
the can and its contents, concluding it was a 
prohibited weapon because it was designed to 
be used for and was capable of immobilizing or 
otherwise incapacitating any person. The expert 
also testified, however, that had the can been 
“bear spray”, it would have been legal since the 
manufacturer designs them for use against 
bears, not people.  
 
The trial judge was not satisfied the Crown had 
proven the actus reus of the offence.  He could 
not reconcile the difference between a person 
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having lawful possession of a larger can of bear 
spray and the accused unlawfully possessing a 
smaller can containing the same substance.  In 
his view, the size and shape of the canister was 
insufficient to differentiate between the 
criminal possession of the pepper spray by the 
accused and the lawful possession of bear spray, 
for example, by a prospector. The accused was 
acquitted. 
 
The accused’s acquittal was successfully 
appealed by the Crown to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court justice 
substituted a conviction, opining that the 
evidence clearly showed that the canister found 
in possession of the accused was unequivocally a 
prohibited weapon. As for the mens rea 
component of the offence, the Supreme Court 
held that knowledge of the prohibited 
characteristics could be inferred. The accused 
further appealed to the British Columbia’s top 
court. He argued that the Supreme Court 
decision found an error on a question of fact, 
which it was not entitled to do.  
 
In allowing the appeal, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal concluded the uncontradicted 
evidence of the expert accepted by the trial 
judge was that the canister in possession of the 
accused satisfied the definition of a prohibited 
weapon under the Regulations.  However, the 
trial judge was not satisfied it was a prohibited 
weapon because the same substance sold as 
"bear spray" was not. This was an error Justice 
Ryan ruled, stating: 
 
In my view the trial judge erred in basing his 
decision on two legally irrelevant 
considerations:  first, that the substance in 
both containers could be used to incapacitate 
humans; and second, that possession of the 
larger canisters of "bear spray" was not 
illegal.  What is prohibited is an item designed 
to be used to incapacitate humans; that the 
substance in both types of canister may be 
used to incapacitate humans is immaterial.  
 
It was also wrong for the trial judge to ask 
whether the smaller can of spray should be 
illegal to possess when a larger canister of 
the same substance is not.  What should or 
should not be criminalized is a question for 
Parliament. [paras. 20-21] 
 
However, since the trial judge only addressed 
the actus reus of the offence and not the mens 
rea it was wrong for the Supreme Court justice 
to enter a conviction. As a result, the conviction 
was set aside and a new trial was ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
 
SAFETY SEARCH DURING DRUG 
INVESTIGATION REASONABLE 
R. v. Bercier, 2004 MBCA 51 
 
A police officer received 
information from a reliable and 
confidential informant that two 
unknown white males in their late 
teens operating a white Honda Accord would be 
buying “Crystal Meth” between 4:00 pm and 5:00 
pm from another male. This drug transaction 
would reportedly occur that day outside the Club 
Regent Hotel and Casino. Police attended the 
hotel after 5:00 pm and saw a white Honda 
Accord parked in front of the hotel entrance. 
One young male was in the driver’s seat of the 
Honda while a second young male stood along side 
the car speaking on a cellular telephone. The 
officer concluded that what he saw was what the 
informant described.  
 
The officer approached and began to inform the 
accused, the male standing outside the car, that 
they had information he was involved in a drug 
transaction. The accused started to back away. 
The officer, thinking the accused may flee or 
engage in a confrontation, took hold of him by 
the forearm. He tried to further pull away, but 
was subsequently handcuffed for safety 
reasons—he was then pat frisked for weapons. 
Feeling something in the front pouch of the 
‘kangaroo’ pullover sweatshirt, the officer looked 
inside the pouch and saw a clear plastic baggie 
containing marihuana. After he was arrested and 
 14            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 4 Issue 3 
  May/June 2004 
searched further, police found a variety of drugs 
and cash.  
 
The accused was charged with possession of 
marihuana, cocaine, ectasy, and proceeds of 
crime. The trial judge found the officer acted 
properly in detaining and searching him. The 
police were not acting on a hunch, but had real 
information to act upon. The search, as well, was 
reasonable and the evidence discovered was 
admissible. Not satisfied with the outcome, the 
accused appealed his conviction to the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal arguing the officer lacked an 
articulable cause for the detention, thereby 
rendering it arbitrary, and also that the safety 
search exceeded its permissible scope.  
 
In dismissing the accused’s conviction appeal, 
Justice Monin of the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
found the detention and search lawful, writing: 
 
By acting on the information made available 
to them by the informant, there is no 
question that [the police] were acting within 
the general scope of the duties of a police 
officer to prevent crime and to protect life 
and property when [the officer] temporarily 
detained the accused to further the 
investigation. Further, the interference of 
the liberty of the accused was necessary for 
the carrying out of the police duty and, in my 
view, was reasonable having regard to the 
nature of the liberty interfered with and the 
importance of the public purpose served by 
the interference. When analyzing the words 
spoken by [the officer] and his judgment call 
to handcuff the accused, it is important to 
keep in mind the brief time frame and the 
circumstances of the encounter. The police 
were investigating a drug transaction. It is 
therefore not surprising that [the officer] 
was concerned about the possibility of 
weapons and was uncertain about what the 
accused was going to do. The reasonableness 
of [the officer’s] actions must be assessed in 
that context. And it is for these reasons 
that the patdown search for safety reasons 
met the two branches of the Waterfield test 
as well. 
……… 
Furthermore, I am satisfied on the facts of 
this case that there existed the basis to 
have an "articulable cause" if one is in fact 
required. The conduct of the police was not 
an indiscriminate and discretionary exercise 
of the police power. The actions of the police 
were not as a result of a hunch. This was not 
a subjectively based assessment made by 
police based on irrelevant factors such as 
the accused's sex, colour, age or ethnic 
origin. The tip received was not from an 
unknown source, and the details provided 
were sufficient for one to conclude that 
there existed compelling current information 
that could reasonably lead the officers to 
suspect that the accused was or was about to 
be involved in criminal activity. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
FAILURE OF ONE SEARCH 
POWER DOES NOT TAINT 
ANOTHER 
R. v. Andrews, 2004 MBCA 60 
 
Police received information from 
a registered confidential 
informant that the accused was 
bringing cocaine from Mexico to 
British Columbia and would be 
distributing it in Winnipeg. Other information 
provided by the informant to the police was 
confirmed as accurate through a number of 
independent sources. About a month later, the 
police received further information the accused 
was enroute to Winnipeg with cocaine. A 
previously obtained dial number recorder 
warrant tracked the accused’s cell phone across 
western Canada. The next day the police stopped 
and arrested the accused as he was entering 
Winnipeg. After being informed of his Charter 
rights and told he could call a lawyer at the 
police office, he was asked how many kilograms 
of cocaine he had. The accused replied, “Just 
the two in the cooler.” 
 
The police prepared an information to obtain a 
search warrant under s.11 of the Controlled 
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Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), which 
included the informant information, the 
confirmation of that information, and the 
questioning and answer of the accused. The 
warrant was granted and police found two 
kilograms of cocaine in a cooler in the accused’s 
van.  
 
At his trial, the accused argued his rights were 
breached under s.10(b) of the Charter when the 
officer asked him about the cocaine before he 
had an opportunity to call a lawyer. He submitted 
that using the conversation in the information to 
obtain rendered the warrant unlawful and 
therefore the evidence should be excluded 
under s.24(2). Although the trial judge agreed 
the accused’s s.10(b) right was violated, he 
concluded that even without reference to the 
accused’s comment about the location and 
quantity of cocaine there still existed a 
sufficient basis for the search warrant.  
 
The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal contending that a sworn information 
under s.11 of the CDSA requires the informant 
information support the commission of offences 
current in time, rather than offences to be 
committed in the future—such as being in 
possession of a controlled substance at a later 
point in time.  
 
Without addressing this s.11 argument, the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal examined whether the 
common law authority of search incidental to 
arrest allowed for the search.  The accused 
submitted that it did not, since the police opted 
to obtain a search warrant and could not now 
rely on the incidental search power to justify 
the search. In the accused’s view, if the warrant 
was unlawful, as he submitted, the search could 
not be made valid under a different search 
power. The Manitoba Court of Appeal disagreed 
and held the search lawful as an incident to 
arrest. The court stated: 
 
In the present case…the fact that the search 
took place subsequent to the arrest, when the 
vehicle was brought to police headquarters, 
does not negate the common law right of 
search for the purpose of discovering 
incriminating evidence… 
 
Where there are two parallel and concurrent 
means of effecting a lawful search, and one 
fails for some procedural reason, that failure 
does not taint the other process which is not 
found to be defective. [para. 17-18] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
IMPROPELY DEMANDED ASD 
SAMPLE CANNOT BE USED FOR 
GROUNDS  
R. v. Woods, 2004 MBCA 46 
 
After stopping the accused 
driving at 10:30 pm, police noted 
a strong odour of liquor and 
demanded a roadside breath 
sample into an approved screening device under 
s.254(2) of the Criminal Code. The accused 
refused, was arrested for failing to comply with 
the demand, and was informed of his right to 
counsel and given the police warning. The 
accused said he wanted to speak with a lawyer 
but was told he would have to wait until at the 
office, since there was no cell phone available in 
the police car.  
 
The officer waited for a tow truck which caused 
a delay in arriving at the police station. After 
speaking with a lawyer at 11:24 pm, the accused 
now told the officer he wished to provide a 
sample. The ASD demand was read again and the 
accused failed. He was then arrested for 
impaired driving and given a breathalyser 
demand, his right to counsel, and police warning. 
He again spoke with a lawyer, subsequently 
provided two breath samples—both 120mg%—
and was charged with driving over 80mg% and 
impaired driving. 
 
At his trial in Manitoba Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of driving over 80 mg% 
and a stay of proceedings was entered on the 
impaired driving charge. The trial judge found 
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that the ASD sample had been taken 
“forthwith”—as s.254(2) of the Criminal Code 
requires—because the refusal was continuous 
from the time he was stopped until one hour and 
10 minutes later when he changed his mind at the 
Public Safety Building.  Thus, in her opinion the 
sample provided was in response to the demand 
made at the roadside.  
 
On appeal to the Manitoba Court of Queen’s 
Bench, the appeal justice concluded the 
accused’s rights under s.8 of the Charter had 
been breached. In the appeal justice’s view, the 
breath sample ultimately provided was in 
response to the demand made at the Public 
Safety Building—not the one made at the 
roadside—and went well beyond that 
contemplated by the meaning of “forthwith”. 
Consequently, a verdict of acquittal was entered. 
The Crown appealed, this time to the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal. 
 
Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code provides for 
the testing of the presence of alcohol in a 
vehicle operator’s breath provided a peace 
officer reasonably suspects they have alcohol in 
their body. Under this section, a peace officer 
may make a demand requiring the person 
forthwith provide a sample of their breath into 
an approved screening device. As Manitoba’s top 
court noted, this section provides “a convenient 
tool for confirming or rejecting a suspicion 
regarding the commission of an alcohol-related 
driving offence. It is a screening test to be 
administered immediately and with minimal 
inconvenience to drivers who are being 
arbitrarily detained.” Justice Philp, authoring 
the unanimous judgment continued: 
 
When a demand is made by a peace officer to 
a person pursuant to s. 254(2), it is the 
providing of the breath sample by the person 
that must be done "forthwith." That is the 
plain meaning of the words of the section. 
However, the courts have construed the 
provision to require the peace officer, as well, 
to act with promptitude and to make the 
demand immediately after the person is 
stopped. [para. 19] 
Since the accused provided the sample one hour 
and 10 minutes after the stop, it could not be 
said the sample was taken forthwith. Rather, the 
ASD sample provided at the Public Safety 
Building was a consequence of the invalid second 
demand. Justice Philp wrote: 
In my view, the accused's "agreement" (that is 
the finding the trial judge made) to provide a 
breath sample for an ASD test at the Public 
Safety Building, when he was under arrest and 
no longer had care or control of his vehicle, 
was not in response to the demand that had 
been made at the roadside over an hour 
earlier. That earlier demand was exhausted 
when the accused had refused to comply and 
was placed under arrest for so doing. The ASD 
sample was not provided "forthwith" even 
under the broadest interpretation of the 
word. The fact that the accused's refusal was 
the reason why the sample had not been 
provided earlier does not bring the test within 
the ambit of the section. 
 
I am further of the view that the demand for 
an ASD sample that [the police] made at the 
Public Safety Building fell outside the ambit of 
s. 254(2), both temporally and spatially, and 
was not authorized by it. The accused had no 
obligation to comply with that demand and 
would not have committed an offence if he had 
refused to do so. [para. 23-24] 
 
This fail reading therefore could not be relied 
upon as part of the reasonable and probable 
grounds required for a breathalyser demand. 
The breathalyser analysis evidencing the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood 
was inadmissible and the Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. The Court also noted, however, that 
there was no apparent reason why the accused 
could not have been prosecuted for the initial 
roadside refusal. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
It is better to know less and apply what you 
know, than to know more and do nothing—
Unknown  
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BAD JOKE NOT INTENDED TO 
OBSTRUCT OFFICER 
R. v. Rutherford, 2004 ABPC 64 
 
The accused was released from 
prison on statutory release. His 
conditions included abstaining 
from all intoxicants and a no 
contact order with his wife. The police 
responded to a tip that he and his wife were 
about to check into a hotel. They located the 
accused at a bus shelter about 12 blocks from 
the hotel and asked him his name. He gave a 
false name, but the officer recognized him. He 
was arrested and police found crack cocaine in 
his possession. The accused was charged with 
being unlawfully at large, obstructing a peace 
officer, and possession of a controlled 
substance. 
 
At trial the accused invited a conviction for 
possessing the cocaine, but argued there was 
insufficient evidence for being unlawfully at 
large or for the obstruct charge. He submitted 
that he was joking when he gave the false name 
and it was obvious the police knew who he was 
when they approached him at the bus shelter. 
The accused testified he had contact with his 
wife contrary to the statutory release 
conditions, but argued that a breach of that 
condition did not render him at large, in the 
sense of removing himself from the custody of 
the correctional authorities.  
 
Unlawfully at Large 
 
Section 145(1)(b) of the Criminal Code creates a 
hybrid offence for a person to be at large 
without lawful excuse. Alberta Provincial Court 
Justice Meagher concluded that a breach of a 
condition designed to control inmate behaviour 
on release, such as the no contact order, does 
not necessarily amount to an intention to 
abscond or withdraw oneself from the custody 
of correctional authorities which would render 
the person unlawfully at large. In other words, 
merely breaching a behavioural condition is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for being at 
large without lawful excuse. However, failing to 
return to a designated institution as required or 
failing to remain within a designated area may 
bring liability under this section. Justice 
Meagher stated: 
 
In order for the accused to be convicted [for 
being unlawfully at large] the Crown must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
accused intended to withdraw himself from 
the control, in the sense of custody, of the 
correctional authorities. In this case, merely 
because the accused breached the no contact 
provision in his Statutory Release Certificate, 
I am not prepared to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he intended to withdraw himself 
from the custody of the correctional 
authorities so as to make himself “ at large”, 
within the meaning of section 145( 1)( b) of the 
Criminal Code of Canada. While this breach of 
condition may have affected the control 
exercised over this accused by the 
correctional authorities, thereby subjecting 
him to other remedies including the suspension 
of his parole, this particular loss of some 
degree of control does not amount to a 
withdrawal from the custody of the 
correctional authorities. … [para. 24] 
 
Obstruction 
 
A conviction for obstruction requires the Crown 
prove that the purpose of the accused’s action 
was to obstruct the peace officer. In this case, 
the court accepted “the accused’s evidence that 
his intention in giving a false name was a joke, 
albeit a bad joke, and not for the purpose of 
wilfully obstructing the peace officer.”  In 
finding the accused not guilty, Justice Meagher 
held: 
 
The onus is on the Crown to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that at the time the 
accused gave the false name to the police, the 
purpose of the accused’s action was to 
obstruct the peace officer. It does not matter 
that the result was that the peace officer was 
not obstructed in the execution of his duties. 
However, the explanation given by the accused, 
that he was only joking and that it was obvious 
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that the police officers knew who he was, 
creates a reasonable doubt that he intended 
to obstruct the peace officer by giving a false 
name. [para. 25] 
 
However, the accused was convicted of the drug 
offence. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
NUMBER RECORDER WARRANT 
PROVISION 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
R. v. Nguyen et al, 2004 BCSC 76 
 
The police obtained a warrant 
under s.492.2(1) of the Criminal 
Code to record telephone 
numbers called from and made 
to three identified target 
telephones. These recorded phone numbers then 
provided a basis on which to obtain numerous 
telephone records. The four accused were 
subsequently charged jointly with conspiracy to 
traffic in cocaine and heroin.  
 
The provision of s.492.2(1) allows the police to 
seek a warrant for the installation, maintenance, 
monitoring, and removal of a number recorder 
provided a justice is satisfied there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect an offence 
against a federal act has been or will be 
committed and that the use of the number 
recorder would assist the investigation. 
However, the standard of reasonable grounds to 
suspect—or reasonable suspicion—did not meet 
the minimum standard of reasonable belief, the 
constitutional threshold for searches and 
seizures under the Charter in connection with 
criminal investigations. As a result of this 
inconsistency, Justice Halfyard held the number 
recorder warrant provisions of no force or 
effect.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
ABSENT FACTS SUGGESTING 
OTHERWISE, NO NEED TO 
ASK IF ALCOHOL RECENTLY 
CONSUMED 
R. v. Szybunka, 2004 ABPC 52 
 
A police officer working a Stop-
Check program pulled the 
accused and his two passengers 
over after observing the vehicle 
drive from a nightclub parking 
lot. His eyes were red and an odour of liquor 
emanated from him. The officer suspected the 
accused was impaired and gave a demand for a 
roadside sample. As a result of the fail reading, 
the officer formed the opinion he had 
reasonable grounds to believe the accused was 
impaired. He was arrested and taken to a breath 
technician where he advised the police he had his 
last drink five minutes before the stop.   
 
At his trial in Alberta Provincial Court, the 
accused maintained that police could not rely on 
the roadside screening fail because the officer 
did not satisfy himself that no alcoholic 
beverage had been consumed within 15 minutes 
of the breath sample. Since the fail reading was 
tainted and could not be used as grounds, the 
accused argued the officer lacked sufficient 
cause to process the accused for impaired 
driving. In rejecting the accused’s submission, 
Justice LeReverend stated:  
 
Unless there are facts which are brought to 
the attention of the investigating officer that 
an accused has either consumed alcohol in the 
preceding 15 minutes an officer is not required 
by law to either ask the question or wait the 
15 minutes,” stated the judge. “The 
investigating officer did not have any evidence 
before him that this accused had consumed 
alcohol within 15 minutes of the A.L.E.R.T. 
test. The mere fact that the accused was 
exiting a parking lot of a pub is not sufficient 
to require the officer to ask the question or 
wait the 15 minutes. It is only where the 
officer knows that a suspect has just recently 
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consumed alcohol and that a proper sample can 
only be obtained by waiting at least 15 minutes 
that the waiting requirement is necessary. 
 
Pursuant to s. 254(2) the peace officer had 
grounds to reasonably suspect that the 
accused had alcohol in his body. Those grounds 
were an odour of alcohol emanating from the 
accused and his red eyes. He made a proper 
demand for a breath sample and was entitled 
to rely on the results of the analysis of the 
breath sample. 
 
The police officer's suspicion that the accused 
might be impaired was raised to a belief that 
he had reasonable and probable grounds to 
make a s. 254(3) demand because of the 
failure of the Alco Sensor sample. [para. 13-
15] 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca. 
 
MERE CONVERSATION DOES 
NOT NECESSARILY RENDER A 
DETENTION 
R. v. Macdonald, 2004 SKPC 55 
 
A curious police officer pulled 
up beside two young men walking 
on the road early one morning. 
With his driver’s window down, 
the officer asked the men what 
they were doing, who they were, and where they 
were heading. After getting the information and 
letting them go, the officer learned the accused 
lied about his name and also had a curfew. He 
was later arrested and found to be carrying car 
break-in tools.  
 
In Saskatchewan Provincial Court the accused 
argued he was psychologically detained by police 
when the conversation occurred and therefore 
his s.9, s.10(a) and s.10(b) Charter rights were 
breached. Thus, he submitted the evidence of 
the conversation and the results of the search 
following the arrest should be excluded under 
s.24(2). Justice Singer however, disagreed. In 
his view there was no detention. He said: 
 
The question [of whether an accused was] 
psychologically detained, depends upon each 
set of circumstances. It becomes easier to 
answer if certain elements are present. For 
instance, if there was a demand or direction as 
opposed [to] just ordinary questioning or 
conversation, if the language used and the tone 
of voice expressed compulsion and not mere 
conversation. Even the place where the 
conversation took place must be taken into 
account. Though the basis of a psychological 
restraint is a subjective one based upon the 
personal circumstances of the accused, that 
test has an objective criteria as well, as the 
subjective belief has to be a reasonable belief. 
 
In order then to be detained by the police 
there must be some direction or words on the 
part of the police that results in the 
deprivation of liberty. In other words the 
police must by either physical or psychological 
means attempt to control the movements of 
the citizen. Merely asking questions as took 
place in this case, does not have this element 
of direction or compulsion.  
 
In this case there was no direction from the 
police officer of any kind that could be 
interpreted objectively as compulsion or 
direction to talk. While the accused may have 
believed he must talk to the police in this 
situation, there was no physical restraint on 
the accused nor were there any words used by 
the police officer that would indicate that the 
accused was restrained in his movements or 
that he had to answer the questions put to 
him. He was not even asked to come over to 
the police car, he was just asked his name. 
 
I find that on the particular circumstances of 
this case that the accused was not detained 
and therefore that there was no breach of his 
charter rights. [para. 22-25] 
 
The accused was convicted of obstructing a 
police officer, breach of recognizance and 
possession of break-in instruments.  
 
Complete case available online at www.canlii.org.  
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REQUESTED TEST AFTER  
24-HOUR PROHIBITION  
MUST BE GIVEN 
Green v. McLean, 2004 BCSC 536 
 
A police officer stopped the 
petitioner after observing him 
not wearing his seatbelt and his 
vehicle without tail lights and 
weaving. The officer noticed the petitioner had 
an odour of alcohol on his breath and that his 
eyes were glassy and bloodshot. The petitioner, 
on the other hand, denied consuming alcohol and 
said that beer had been spilled on him. An 
Approved Screening Device (ASD) test was 
conducted and the accused failed. Although the 
officer felt he could proceed with a full impaired 
driving investigation, he decided to only issue the 
petitioner with a 24-hour driving prohibition 
under s.215 of the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA)—a 
provision that empowers a police officer to 
automatically suspend a driver’s licence for 24 
hours where the officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the driver’s ability is 
affected by alcohol.   
 
Section 215(6) of the MVA states: 
 
If a driver, who is served with a notice of driving 
prohibition under section (2), forthwith requests a 
peace officer to administer and does undergo as soon 
as practicable a test that indicates that his or her 
blood alcohol level does not exceed 50mg of alcohol in 
100 mL of blood, the prohibition from driving is 
terminated. 
 
Section 215(7) also recognizes the right of the 
driver to have the prohibition terminated if they 
can produce a medical certificate showing blood 
alcohol content not in excess of 50mg%.  
 
The petitioner was served with a notice of 
prohibition which stated, on the reverse, that he 
had the right to either request a breathalyser 
test or obtain a certificate from a medical 
practitioner if he did not accept the prohibition. 
As a result, the petitioner demanded a test. But 
the officer refused on the grounds he had 
already administered a test—he felt a second 
test would be redundant.  
 
The petitioner sought a judicial review of the 
officer’s decision in the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia.  He submitted that his right to 
demand a test arose after the notice of 
prohibition was served and, in any event, the 
ASD test performed was not a “test” within the 
meaning of s.215 or the notice he was served. 
Justice McEwan agreed on both these points. 
 
First, once the notice of prohibition was served, 
the petitioner had the right to request a test to 
establish the concentration of alcohol in his 
body. It is the receipt of the notice that 
triggers the right to be tested, regardless of 
whether a test preceded the issuance of the 
prohibition. Secondly, although the notice uses 
the term “breathalyser” in a generic sense, the 
“test” referred to in s.215 requires the use of an 
approved instrument that measures the 
concentration of alcohol in a person’s blood, not 
an approved screening device that merely 
measures the presence of alcohol.  
 
Section 215(6) provides a driver who does not 
accept a prohibition with the right to request a 
test, which in Justice McEwan’s view left no 
room for the exercise of police discretion. The 
officer’s refusal to test the petitioner after the 
prohibition was served on the basis of the ASD 
results rendered the 24-hour prohibition invalid. 
The prohibition was set aside.  
 
Complete copy available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
The defence also cites a 1951 notion that 
identification must be based upon a verbal 
inventory of the perpetrator's face and build, 
and not on recognition. …It strikes me as dubious 
psychology. I recognize Clark Gable or Helen 
Mirren when I see them in movies, but I cannot 
usefully describe them, even their height or 
weight.2—Alberta Court of Appeal Justice Cote 
                                                 
2 R. v. Zurowski, 2003 ABCA 315 
